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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature revised the laws control-
ling dependent and neglected children. This enactment ex-
pressly designated all dependent and neglected children as
"Children in Need of Protection or Services," otherwise known
as "CHIPS children."1 The change in name was accompanied by
substantive changes in the statutes designed to reduce the public
stigma of dependent and neglected children who are the subject
of child protection proceedings.2 A "CHIPS petition" is a pro-
ceeding commenced in juvenile court to address the needs of
children and their parents who are in a variety of forms of dis-
tress. Although most commonly commenced by the county at-
torney, a petition can also be commenced by any interested
person, as this Article will discuss in detail. The CHIPS statute
expanded the group of persons who may initiate CHIPS pro-
ceedings to include both private individuals and county
attorneys.3
This Article discusses the current status of Minnesota law re-
garding CHIPS children and child protection proceedings. The
Article proposes specific policy changes and advocates for more
widespread acceptance of the so-called "private CHIPS petition"
to address the increasing incidence and scope of family and
childhood problems facing society today. Part II analyzes private
CHIPS petitions through examination of the historical treat-
ment of the family and childhood, and the evolution of methods
to address the needs of abused, neglected, and dependent chil-
dren. Part III explores the history of Minnesota dependency
1. Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 260.015 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
2. See infra part III; see also Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031.
3. Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031.
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and neglect statutes. Part IV discusses CHIPS procedures under
the new statutes and examines shortcomings and problems asso-
ciated with the current statute and procedures. Finally, Part V
concludes with an analysis of the nature and role of private
CHIPS petitions in a juvenile court system that increasingly is
called upon to address some of the most pervasive and serious
problems facing our society today.
II. THE HISTORIcAL TREATMENT OF DEPENDENT AND
NEGLECTED CHILDREN
To fully appreciate our current approach to dependent and
neglected children and to avoid many of the mistakes made in
the past, the historical treatment of such children and their fam-
ilies must be considered. Not only does history support in-
creased use of private CHIPS petitions, it also makes clear that
we continue to struggle with many of the same issues our fore-
bears grappled with in treating abused, dependent, and ne-
glected children. Today, however, we have the means to more
effectively address the needs of these children.
A. Medieval and Early Modern Eurape
French historian Philippe Arias, in his chronicles of the con-
cepts of family and childhood from the Middle Ages through the
twentieth century, discusses significant trends in Europe that
would later seep into American society and affect the ways that
children were treated in the American court system.4 According
to Ari~s, family and childhood as we know them today did not
exist in the Middle Ages.5 During the Middle Ages and for a
long time thereafter, nothing in a child's dress or activities dis-
tinguished the child from the adult.6 Further, once children
reached the ages of five to seven, they joined adults in their
household chores, field and shop work, and other adult activi-
ties.7 Childhood lasted for a significantly shorter period of time
than it lasts today.' One may assume, therefore, that very few
4. PHILIPPE ARIfts, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SociAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 9-
11 (Robert Baldick trans., 1962).
5. Id. at 128.
6. Id. at 50.
7. Id. at 329.
8. Id. at 50, 329.
1994]
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special programs existed to assist troubled children and that
abused or neglected children most likely fended for themselves.
In the late 1600s, as Christianity focused more on living a
moral and godly life while on earth, supplanting the focus dur-
ing the Middle Ages on life in the hereafter, the concept of the
family and childhood dramatically changed.' Underlying this
transformation was the notion that morality and proper behavior
had to be taught to young and impressionable children away
from the "corrupt world of adults."10 As a result of these
changes, many middle class children received more formal and
extended schooling.1 This new focus on educating children was
accompanied by a heightened interest in their well-being.12 Par-
ents generally desired to watch over their children more closely,
keep them healthy, stay nearer to them, and avoid relinquishing
them, even temporarily, to the care of another family.' 3 By the
seventeenth century, the middle class began to center itself on
the child.1 4 Most significant to this shift in focus was the crea-
tion of more schools in order to bring the schools closer to the
children and their middle class parents' homes.'5
As would later be seen in early America,' 6 the nuclear family
eventually replaced the extended family as the fundamental unit
of organized society in eighteenth century Europe, enhancing
the private life between parents and their children?7 As a result,
parents, and society in general, spent more time focusing on
their children's needs and futures.' 8 The energy of the emerg-
ing nuclear family became increasingly focused on helping the
child to grow up and to develop into a contributing individual in
the world of adulthood.' 9 This new preoccupation with the
physical and moral aspects of an ever-expanding period of child-
hood was unknown to the medieval world.20
9. AiRis, supra note 4, at 412.
10. Id. at 369.
11. Id. at 369-71.
12. Id. at 370.
13. Id. at 369.
14. ARIPs, supra note 4, at 369.
15. Id. at 370.
16. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
17. ARizs, supra note 4, at 398-400.
18. Id. at 403.
19. See id. at 398-404.
20. See id. at 365-404 for a comparison of the medieval family with the modern
family which was largely developed in the eighteenth century.
[Vol. 20
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B. Colonial America
The same trends that affected children and families in early
post-Medieval Europe were also seen in early American families.
Early American colonial society consisted primarily of small
towns and rural lifestyles.21 Most families were intimately tied to
these small communities, and family structure was quite patriar-
chal. 22 The birth of children and subsequent marriage of off-
spring were driven more by economic and social conditions than
emotional factors.23 Order and hierarchy within the closely knit
individual families and tightly structured communities
predominated in American family life throughout the seven-
24teenth century.
Against this backdrop of closely knit families and communities
and the patriarchal hierarchy of colonial America, at least one
historian has documented a cyclical interest in child abuse and
neglect throughout American history that began during the co-
lonial era.2 5 The first American response to child abuse and ne-
glect occurred in the mid-seventeenth century when the Puritans
of colonial Massachusetts enacted the first laws anywhere in the
world to address what they called "unnatural severity" to chil-
dren. 26 This reflects the family's primary role as a unit of social
21. PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND FAMILY IN
COLONIAL ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 72-78 (1970).
22. Id. The primary characteristic of the patriarchal structure was the father's con-
trol over important family decisions. Id.
23. Id. A marriage could not occur unless the father negotiated a marriage settle-
ment or approved of the marriage by consenting and by donating land. Id.
24. See id. at 72-99 for a discussion of the patriarchal family and its effect on the
creation of the next generation of families.
25. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYANrNY- THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987). For a thorough dis-
cussion of child abuse from a historical perspective in a variety of historical societies
and cultures, see SANDERJ. BREINER, M.D., SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: CHILD ABUSE
THROUGH THE AGES AND TODAY (1990).
26. PLECK, supra note 25, at 17. According to Pleck, the Puritans viewed the family
as "vital to their endeavor; it conveyed religious values and prepared the young for a
pious life. It was also the foundation upon which a religious commonwealth was built."
Id. Therefore, cruelty and violence were to be prevented because they "threatened the
individual's and the community's standing before God." Id. Pleck observed that "with
this view of the family, combined with advanced humanitarian ideas on the rights of
women and children brought with them from England, the Puritans developed the
concept of family violence as a public concern." Id.
According to Pleck, "the Puritans attacked family violence with the combined
forces of community, church, and state. In Puritan society, meddling was a positive
virtue." Id. at 18. Despite this, it must be remembered that the Puritans only inter-
vened in problem families
19941
5
Walling and Debele: Private Chips Petitions in Minnesota: The Historical and Contempo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
control in the colonial period. 7 Local officials stood ready to
intervene whenever the welfare of children seemed imperiled by
the conduct of their parents.
28
The American Colonies' approach to the needs of neglected
or abused children and troubled families was heavily influenced
by the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 which was premised on the
notion that poverty was a sin of the parents that also affected the
children. 29 To protect the innocent children and, more impor-
tant in colonial society, to punish the parents, children were sep-
arated from their parents by apprenticeship or by placement in
an institution. 0 These children were often mixed indiscrimi-
nately with adult homeless persons, the mentally ill, and men-
tally retarded persons. 31  Apprenticeships were not only
inexpensive to the community, but they provided an inexpensive
source of much needed labor in a frontier society and provided
to correct the most severe abuses rather than to protect the rights of individu-
als.... Puritans regarded outside intervention as disruptive, justifiable only to
the extent that it restored family order. Faced with the choice between pre-
serving the family unit and permitting a victim of family violence to be re-
moved from an abusive household, they invariably chose to preserve the male-
dominated family.
Id. at 18.
In discussing the Puritans' approach to reconciling the state's role in protecting
children with the state's role in preserving individual rights, Pleck makes the following
observation:
In all their laws and punishments, the Puritans demonstrated their belief
in the state's responsibility to enforce morality and instill respect for legitimate
authority. Thus, Puritan laws against family violence conformed to their views
about the importance of proper, but not excessive, authority in all relation-
ships, including those in the family. Nonetheless, many Puritan laws against
family violence were rarely enforced....
The absence of complaints about child abuse extended beyond the
boundaries of colonial Plymouth....
The [widespread] hesitancy to charge a natural father or mother with
child assault or to remove abused children from their parents can be attrib-
uted to the Puritans' reverence for the two-parent, father-dominated house-
hold and the belief in the bond between a child and his or her natural
parents. The courts removed or 'put out' a few children to live with relatives
or neighbors because of parental neglect of the child's Christian education or
parental criminality, but not on grounds of abuse.
Id. at 27-29.
27. See id. at 17-33.
28. See JOHN DEMOS, 'PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE
COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 24-40 (1986).
29. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 299 (1972).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 301.
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a means of teaching the children skills to become productive
members of society.32
This stage of historical development is relevant to the current
status of CHIPS law in Minnesota. When courts intervened in
family matters to address problems of dependency, neglect, or
abuse in colonial society, the court action generally was the re-
sult of intervention by private individuals with personal knowl-
edge of the particular circumstances."3 These private individuals
usually were friends, relatives, neighbors, or ministers.3 4 Little
value was attached to personal and domestic privacy in early New
England. For example, elected officials had the same power to
oversee family life that they had to oversee other aspects of life.35
Neighbors accepted informal oversight and responsibility for
one another as part of their "Christian duty."3 6 While this situa-
tion would change dramatically during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, it supports by example the concept of private
individuals invoking state resources to address the needs of
abused or neglected children.
C. Eighteenth Century America
At the close of the seventeenth century, the colonial notions
of societal morality began to crumble, 37 a phenomenon resulting
from the westward expansion of the colonies 38 and the increas-
ingly diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds of the new immi-
grants arriving in the colonies. 39  As governments became
increasingly more secular, religious practices more diverse, and
society more heterogenous, the church played an increasingly
smaller role in punishing moral offenders.40 At the same time,
secularization of the states and the emergence of individual
32. Id.
33. DEMOS, supra note 28, at 81.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 82.
36. Id.
37. PLECK, supra note 25, at 31.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 31. At one time, church courts actively investigated spousal abuse and
child abuse and neglect, as well as other crimes. After the investigation, a hearing
would be held before the entire congregation to "wring" a confession from the accused
to save his soul. "[Bly the end of the eighteenth century many churches had abolished
their courts," which was another sign of the development of increasingly separate and
more private family life. Id. at 20, 31-33.
1994]
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rights during this Age of the Enlightenment undermined the
state's authority to intervene in family or private matters.4 1
Changes in the church and state involvement in eighteenth-
century family life were accompanied by dramatic changes in the
view of children and childhood, following the trends that Ari~s
had observed in other Western nations.42 The theology of John
Calvin, which had heavily influenced the early settlers of the New
England colonies, viewed children as generally sinful creatures
and childhood as something not to be prolonged, but rather dis-
pensed with as soon as possible. 43 As had previously happened
in Europe, the philosophy of the Enlightenment gradually re-
placed the philosophy of Calvin in the United States.4 4 The phi-
41. Id.
42. SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREmSS? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA 15-16 (1982). See also, PLECK, supra note 25, at 34-48. Here, Pleck specifi-
cally discusses changing views of childhood in the colonies and then in the young
American nation in the eighteenth century. In particular, she describes the strong im-
pact of Scottish philosopherJohn Locke in his 1693 treatise, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERN-
ING THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN. Pleck explains that Locke
gave corporal punishment a secure but nonetheless circumscribed place. He
advocated an entire system of childrearing rules based on the concept of re-
ward and punishment.... He believed that children should be treated as
'rational creatures' and rewarded with esteem and praise; parents to withhold
approval until the child obeyed completely.... Locke had moved one step
away from the Calvinist belief in the innate sinfulness of the [child].
PLECK, supra note 25, at 35. Locke gained adherents during the Revolutionary period
among colonial rebels who opposed tyranny in the home or the state. Thus, one begins
to see the emergence of "republican" notions of the family and childrearing in late
colonial and early American society. Id. at 37.
43. Rather than filled with playful and carefree childhood activities, Calvinists be-
lieved childhood should be filled with discipline, labor, and religious training. ROBERT
H. BREMNER, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, 1600-1865, 35 (1970). In his work,
Bremner stated:
Parents should govern their children well, restrain, reprove, correct them, as
there is occasion. A Christian householder should rule well his own house ...
Children should not be left to themselves, to a loose end, to do as they please;
... You should restrain your children from sin as much as possible... Divine
precepts plainly show that, as there is occasion, you should chasten and cor-
rect your children; you dishonor God and hurt them if you neglect it.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN WADSwoRTH, THE WELL-ORDERED FAMILY 44-
58 (1719)).
44. WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAw TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 110 (3d ed. 1984).
In his text, J.M. Kelly describes the Enlightenment as:
[A] shared mood or temper, or attitude to the world, in which the dominant
note was one of profound skepticism toward traditional systems of authority or
orthodoxy (especially those of religion), and a strong faith in the power of the
human reason and intelligence to make unlimited advances in sciences and
techniques conducive to human welfare.
J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 249-50 (1992).
[Vol. 20
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losophy of the Enlightenment, as epitomized in the works of
John Locke, came to view children as pliant, delicate creatures
with empty minds that needed nurturing through reasoning.4 5
By the end of the eighteenth century, at least within the con-
fines of the highly influential middle and upper class white fami-
lies, the Enlightenment view of childhood was embraced as the
view that would best serve the needs of a free and emerging new
nation.46 For the poor and isolated of society, the treatment of
abused, neglected, and dependent children remained more old-
fashioned and similar to what had occurred in the colonial era.
47
Changes among these populations would not occur until well
into the nineteenth century.
D. Nineteenth Century America
As discussed above, the modem American family-with its em-
phasis on privacy, nurturing of children, and prolonged status of
childhood-first emerged "in the years between the American
Revolution and about 1830."" 8 The family became ever smaller
in size, and more and more of the family's attention and re-
sources came to be focused on child rearing.49 Picking up on
the philosophies of John Locke, the notion of "Christian nur-
ture" became increasingly popular.5" According to this view, the
role of the family was to surround the child with love and exam-
ples of proper behavior and values. 51 Nurture, rather than hard
work and labor, came to be the hallmark of middle class child-
hood and the sought after model family.52
The nineteenth century also gave rise to the so-called "republi-
can family." Among the traits of the new republican family
were an economic shift from production to consumption, a de-
cline of generational influences, decreasing family size, mar-
riages that were increasingly voluntary and based on love rather
than economics, the elevation of childhood and motherhood to
45. TRAT-rNER, supra note 44, at 110.
46. PLECK, supra note 25, at 47.
47. See id.; supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
48. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8 (1980).
49. Id. at 9.
50. TRATTNER, supra note 44, at 110.
51. Id. at 110-11.
52. Id.; see TIFFIN, supra note 42, at 17-19.
53. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-9 (1985).
1994]
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a favored status in the home, and a more defined use of private
property as a major source of domestic autonomy.54 The emer-
gence of the republican family reflected the transition of the
family from a public to a private institution. 55 As it became more
private and removed from society, the family, ironically, came to
be seen as even more important to the nation's well-being.
56
The republican family remained an elusive ideal for most poor
families and their children-especially for abused, neglected,
and orphaned children. "The poor-law system of child care,"
with its almshouses, outdoor relief, and apprenticeships, was es-
tablished to address the needs of those children. 57 During the
first half of the nineteenth century, a significant number of poor
and orphaned children found themselves in almshouses.5 Such
facilities frequently held homeless and mentally ill adults and
persons suffering from venereal disease together with depen-
dent, abused, neglected, or delinquent children.59 Though
many early nineteenth century reformers criticized the intermin-
gling of children and adults in these institutions, the numbers of
children in almshouses increased from year to year.60
The growing number of children in almshouses does not
mean, however, that most abused or neglected children were re-
moved or protected from their harmful environments. In fact,
for the majority of Americans, the concern for family privacy
outweighed the willingness to allow state intervention to protect
or rescue children from their families. 61 For example, parental
criminality and drunkenness, deemed to be public matters, were
considered grounds for removing children from their parents'
care and control, while physical cruelty to the child, deemed to
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The founders of the nation believed that an educated populace and chil-
dren raised with democratic ideals were critical to a participatory democracy. With the
increasing duration of childhood and dependence, the home and family was critical to
this inculcation of democratic values.
57. See Thomas, supra note 29, at 300-01. All 16 of the states at that time had alms-
houses, outdoor relief, and apprenticeships. Id. at 302.
58. Id. "The census of 1880 showed that 7,770 children between the ages of two
and sixteen were in almshouses in the United States-fifteen per every 100,000 persons
in the general population. By 1890 this figure was reduced to 4,987, or eight per every
100,000." Id. (citing H. FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED, AND DEPENDENT
CHILDREN 80 (1970)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. PLECK, supra note 25, at 75.
[Vol. 20
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be a private matter, was not.62 It was only after the Civil War that
the public began to accept state intervention in family situations
for the more "private" matters of abuse and neglect.
63
There were, however, reform efforts in the first half of the
nineteenth century. By 1830, a growing number of public and
private orphanages-facilities that housed only children-
emerged in significant numbers to replace the mixed popula-
tion almshouses.6 4 Because the government contributed public
funds for many children receiving care, large institutionalized
orphanages emerged where children remained for long periods
of time, discouraging foster family placements. 65 In contrast to
our modern foster care system, orphanages were viewed as mere
holding facilities for the parentless child rather than as part of
any state-sponsored program to more broadly protect neglected
and abused children.
66
In the 1820s, living standards were on the rise, as were the
sheer numbers of poor people, especially in the cities and
among immigrants. 67 At the same time, society began to distrust
the ability of poor people and immigrants to raise their chil-
dren.68 Parental neglect was considered the prime cause of
delinquency.6"
The first significant child-saving efforts in the nineteenth cen-
tury were institutional and were part of the so-called "Refuge"
movement.70 Houses of Refuge became the first juvenile
reformatories in the U.S. The laws authorized the courts to com-
mit not only child offenders, but also neglected, destitute, aban-
62. Id. at 75-76. Generally, the father had the right to custody of his child, but it
was not an absolute right. The law was most interested in the "benefit of the infant."
The court "look[s] into all the circumstances, and ascertain [s] whether it will be for the
real, permanent interests of the infant.... It is an entire mistake to suppose the court
is at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or that the latter has an
absolute vested right in the custody." BREMNER, supra note 43, at 372 (citing U.S. v.
Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31-32 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256)). SeeExparte Miller, 42 P. 428
(Cal. 1895); Harding v. Harding, 54 N.E. 587 (111. 1899).
63. PLECK, supra note 25, at 70.
64. Thomas, supra note 29, at 303.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ROBERT MENNEL, THoRNs AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940, 16 (1974).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3-31; Thomas, supra note 29, at 306. New York, Boston, and Philadelphia
led the movement with the creation of Houses of Refuge in the 1820s. MENNEL, Supra
note 67, at 3.
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doned, and vagrant children to the Houses of Refuge.71
Through inflexible routines built around workshops and very ru-
dimentary schoolrooms, the Houses of Refuge sought to incul-
cate the middle class values of neatness, diligence, punctuality,
and thrift.72
By the 1850s, dissatisfaction with the charitable methods of the
Houses of Refuge led to the proliferation of other municipal
and state institutions. 73 Yet some people opposed institutions al-
together. The Reverend Charles Loring Brace, a well-known
New York minister, advocated an anti-institutional approach to
addressing the needs of troubled, abused, or delinquent chil-
dren.74  He rejected the institutional formats of almshouses,
Houses of Refuge, and separate orphan asylums, and instead
"organized a child-placement program that stressed free foster
placements in the country to prevent these street children from
growing up into a life of crime in the city."75
Brace organized the New York Children's Aid Society, which
was soon copied in other cites, to send boys and girls to the West
for "moral disinfection."76 There they were placed in free foster
homes provided by farmers.7 7 Despite the program's lofty goals,
high pressure tactics to round up such children frequently re-
sulted in many poor children being unjustifiably and cruelly sep-
arated from their families for long-term, sometimes permanent,
and frequently unhappy placements.
7
At the same time that the above-discussed reforms were going
forward, apprenticeship continued in widespread usage until at
least the last quarter of the nineteenth century to address the
71. MENNEL, supra note 67, at 13. These institutions were part of the same trend
that established publicly funded and larger orphanages. PLECK, supra note 25, at 78.
This trend marked a switch from the family-centered discipline which had
predominated in the colonial era and much of the eighteenth century to the nine-
teenth century system of institutional treatment administered by society on a charitable
basis. Id.
72. MENNEL, supra note 67, at 26-27.
73. Thomas, supra note 29, at 306-07.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 307.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Thomas, supra note 29, at 306-07 (citing A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
30-36 (1967)). Reverend Brace "urged his workers to use persuasion and high-pressure
salesmanship so that children could be deported from the city to the country." Id. at
307.
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needs of both poor and orphaned children.79 Many children
were removed from almshouses and orphanages when they were
physically able to work as apprentices to farmers, tradesmen, sea
captains, or housewives.8" Such apprenticeships were often in
remote areas where the children experienced loneliness, ne-
glect, and low self-esteem."' Apprenticed children generally re-
ceived little protection or attention from public authorities.1
2
These forced apprenticeships came under increasing attack in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.8"
Notions of childhood continued to evolve throughout the
nineteenth century. By the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, children were required to complete additional schooling if
they were to advance economically, and declining birthrates cre-
ated a kind of family in which self-conscious nurture became vi-
tal to an industrial society that needed a more skilled work
force. 4 As a result, conscious efforts were made to enforce the
obedience and dependency of children for even longer periods
of time. 5
Also emerging between the 1870s and the turn of the century
was the notion of what historian Viviana Zelizer has called the
"economically 'worthless' but emotionally 'priceless' child." 6
While children in the eighteenth century were valued as "future
laborer[s] and as security for parents later in life,"8 7 by the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, changing notions of child-
hood and family, the industrialization of society, child labor laws,
and compulsory education laws all led to the sentimentalization
and expansion of the duration of childhood.88 This would have
a dramatic impact on the rise of new notions and institutions to
address the needs of children, especially abused, neglected, and
delinquent children.
79. Id. at 302-303.
80. Id. at 303.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Thomas, supra note 29, at 303.
84. See generally TRATTNER, supra note 44.
85. Id.
86. VriAANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE
OF CHILDREN 3 (1985).
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 3-9.
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E. The Progressive Era
Public interest in child abuse and neglect increased during
the last three decades of the nineteenth century, culminating in
the period of American history known as the Progressive Era."°
The Progressive Era witnessed the emergence of a wealthy urban
elite who were "fearful of social disorder and dismayed by the
poverty, disease, and lawlessness of urban life.""° Blaming the
immigrants and the poor, they hoped to rescue the children
from all of this disorder.91 During the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, when public interest in child abuse and neglect
was high, the Progressives established many innovative institu-
tions to address the needs of dependent and neglected
children. 2
One of the most significant innovations of the late nineteenth
century emerged just before the start of the Progressive Era.
The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children,
created by a lawyer named Elbridge T. Gerry, responded to the
fact that few if any of the agencies and institutions serving previ-
ously identified dependent and orphaned children specifically
sought to locate and rescue neglected or abused children. 3 As a
result of Mr. Gerry's diligent efforts, the Society eventually ac-
quired significant police powers enabling it to forcibly remove
children from the control of their parents.
9 4
89. TiFFIN, supra note 42, at 6. Indeed, this increased interest in child abuse and
neglect had started with the Civil War after which the public generally exhibited a
greater acceptance of governmental intervention to regulate economic conditions and
other aspects of life. PLECK, supra note 25, at 70. This same trend would later
culminate in the 1930s and in the 1960s. Id.
90. PLECK, supra note 25, at 70.
91. Id.
92. Thomas, supra note 29, at 307.
93. Id. at 310. Mr. Gerry observed that the law enforcement agencies and the
courts were too busy or were simply not sufficiently interested to devote the necessary
time and attention to resolve cases involving inappropriate care or discipline by parents
over their children. Id.
94. Id. The creation of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren and other similar prevention agencies was largely given impetus by the notorious
case of Mary Ellen, a little girl in New York City who had been passed from home to
home. PLECK, supra note 25, at 70. The local charity group responsible for supervising
her lost track of her and she ended up in the care and control of a couple who kept her
locked up in an apartment by day and allowed her to roam the streets by night. Id. A
neighbor who heard screams coming from the apartment did some investigation and
found the child severely malnourished, inappropriately dressed, and physically abused.
Id. at 71. Not knowing where else to turn, this neighbor appealed to the American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Id. More investigations followed as
[Vol. 20
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Initially organized in 1874 as a private group, the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children later was given
the power to "file complaints for the violation of any laws affect-
ing children" and "to require law enforcement and court offi-
cials to aid agents of the societies in the enforcement of these
laws." 95 Agents of the Society investigated and advised magis-
trates regarding the disposition and placement of children in
cases involving poor, neglected, or delinquent children.96 Even-
tually, these agents were authorized to arrest parents or other
persons causing harm to children, and anyone who interfered
with or obstructed the work of the Society could be charged with
a misdemeanor.97 Other cities created similar cruelty preven-
tion societies between 1875 and 1900.98
From the beginning, a conflict existed in the methods of these
cruelty societies.9 9 It was a conflict that continues to this day and
is seen in the ongoing struggle to balance the powers of the
state, the family, and the child in addressing the needs of abused
and neglected children. Under the law-enforcement approach
favored by the early cruelty societies, agents received broad po-
lice powers from legislative entities, including the power to sepa-
rate children from their parents and the power to prosecute
parents who could be subsequently sentenced to prison. 100
did a court proceeding. Id. The case became a media frenzy, igniting widespread inter-
est in the plight of neglected and abused children. Several months after the child's
"mother" was convicted of felonious assault and Mary Ellen was placed in an orphan-
age, the New York Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children was created in Decem-
ber of 1874. Id. at 72.
95. Thomas, supra note 29, at 310. For statutory authority see 1881 N.Y. LAws 72,
ch. 676, § 293, reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, 1866-1932 at 195 (R. Bremner ed. 1971).
96. Thomas, supra note 29, at 310.
97. Id. at 311.
98. Id. Most cruelty societies stressed the need for strong law enforcement and
they placed the goal of protecting children ahead of the goal of preserving the family.
PLECK, supra note 25, at 70. Parents were rarely prosecuted for cruelty to their children
which led to a discrepency between the stated goal of the society and their actual work.
Id. Many people, however, viewed these entities as "trampling on the privacy of the
family." Id. at 76. In response to critics of their methods, the cruelty societies success-
fully stressed the need to protect society from future criminals rising from the ranks of
abused and neglected children. Id. The Civil War and its aftermath aided the spread of
cruelty societies as people then responded more favorably to government intervention
to protect what many thought was a general state of crisis for the American families. Id.
at 79. Great faith came to be placed in the State as the savior of the American family
and morality. Id.
99. Thomas, supra note 29, at 312.
100. Id.
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Other reformers and agencies, on the other hand, voiced con-
cerns about this punitive approach and instead advocated "pre-
ventive, remedial, and economic efforts to improve the home" so
that a child could remain with his or her family."'1 This latter
philosophy paved the way for the social work approach to child
protection that is relied upon today.1 2
Changes within the institutions of family and childhood accel-
erated during the Progressive Era.10 3 Many Progressives, con-
cerned over the quality and stability of American life, "saw an
America under siege from increasing crime, poverty, and spread-
ing urban slums.104 Progressives thought that "[b]y providing the
child with a healthy, moral, and secure home environment, ade-
quate schooling, and humane working conditions, . . . a future
American society largely untroubled by vice, crime, . . . poverty,
[c]lass antagonisms, ethnic divisions and racial tensions . . ."
would emerge.10 5 This world view led to the extension of com-
pulsory education laws and to the creation of new schools and
vocational institutions, restructured curricula, restrictions on
child labor, the first juvenile courts, and the federal Children's
Bureau.106
The creation of the firstjuvenile court in Chicago in 1899 was
a seminal development in the treatment of neglected, abused,
and dependent children. 7 While the primary focus of the juve-
nile courts was on delinquency, most of the legislation creating
these courts extended the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts to
those children who were alleged to be neglected.'0 8
Many neglect statutes subsequently enacted and enforced by
the newjuvenile courts permitted neglected children to be com-
mitted to institutions "under summary procedures before minor
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. TWFIN, supra note 42, at 8.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 7-8.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Thomas, supra note 29, at 323. By the end of the 1920s, almost every state had
created a juvenile court system. Id. at 327.
108. Id. at 313-14. Although neglect generally came under juvenile court jurisdic-
tion, most neglect statutes antedated the creation of the first juvenile court. Id. at 314.
Several states had enacted neglect statutes as early as 1825 as a part of the previously
discussed social reform movement that sought to separate children from adult offend-
ers and paupers and to remove children from prisons, jails, and almshouses. Id.
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judicial officials."1"9 The fact that both neglected children and
child offenders were subject to commitment in the same institu-
tions raised significant questions, as did the general lack of pro-
cedural due process of law.' Most laws were upheld based
partly upon the compelling justification that different systems
and practices were needed to keep children in institutions sepa-
rate from adults.' The courts often used the ancient doctrine
of parens patriae to justify their decisions." 2 Ultimately, these
legal challenges involved struggles to balance the parents' rights
to raise their children as they saw fit and the state's need to occa-
sionally intervene in individual family matters in order to safe-
guard children from parental neglect and other social evils." 3
Although they espoused a more kind and loving treatment of
children, the new and separate juvenile courts ultimately served
to expand the nineteenth-century philosophy of preventive pe-
nology." 4 That philosophy had first emerged with the house of
refuge movement and reached its zenith with the spread of the
cruelty societies." 5 The early juvenile courts built on the ideas
of preventive penology that associated poverty and neglect with
crime, disregarded notions of procedural due process, and vigor-
109. Id. at 315. Commitment often occurred without any hearing or notice to the
parents. Id. The constitutionality of these nineteenth-century laws was occasionally
challenged on the basis of unduly broad or vague definitions of the children who were
subject to commitment or of the acts leading to the commitment. Id. See, e.g., County
of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 382 (1882); In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 370 (1882);
People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280, 282 (1870); Farnham v. Piere, 141 Mass.
203, 204 (1886); State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 357, 52 N.W. 935, 935-36
(1892); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406, 407 (1885); In re Crouse, 4 Whart.
9, 10 (Pa. 1839); Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis.
328, 330 (1876).
110. Thomas, supra note 29, at 315.
111. Id.
112. Id. Local authorities had long had the power to remove children from the care
and control of their parents. "This right derived from the medieval English doctrine of
parens patriae ('parent of the nation') which permitted the crown, through Chancery
court proceedings, to intervene on behalf of a child whose welfare was threatened."
PLECK, supra note 25, at 75. This doctrine had previously been used to "preserve the
estates or further the education of wealthy children, or protect adolescents from im-
proper marriages." Id. In nineteenth century America, the doctrine was broadened to
sanction removal of children from homes of abusive or neglectful parents. The state
came to possess not only this common law authority but also statutory authority. This
power became more broadly stated as the nineteenth century wore on. Id.; see also
ANTHONY M. PiATr, THE CHILD SAvERs: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 123-36 (2d ed.
1977).
113. Thomas, supra note 29, at 315.
114. Id. at 323.
115. Id.
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ously employed the parens patriae philosophy tojustify state inter-
vention in private families." 6 As the juvenile courts used their
sweeping new powers, little thought was given to the individual
rights of parents and children." 7
F. Twentieth Century Developments
Eventually, the spirit of reform that had characterized the Pro-
gressive Era declined in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, and the cycle of interest in child abuse and neglect came to
a close. 118 The problems associated with dependent and ne-
glected children did not, however, go away. In fact, heated de-
bates among professionals who interacted with dependent and
neglected children continued unabated during the first half of
the twentieth century. 119 The preventive penology or law-en-
forcement approach favored by the creators of the cruelty socie-
ties and some Progressive reformers gradually was replaced by a
social work methodology. This methodology, known as "protec-
tive services," was intended to strengthen the child's own home
rather than punish or institutionalize members of the family.120
Increasingly, "[c]hild protection became the legal responsibil-
ity of public agencies under federal and state legislation."
121
While the increasing governmental involvement coincided with
the rise of the welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s, these ideas
were rooted in the Progressive Era.
122
Critical to this change in philosophy was the first White House
Conference on Children held in 1909.123 Many participants in
the conference "promoted the idea that a child should not be
removed from his [or her] own home due to poverty alone and
that service and economic programs should be designed to pro-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. PLECK, supra note 25, at 86-87, 125-26.
119. Thomas, supra note 29, at 312. The debates centered around whether to take
prosecutory or preventative and remedial measures with child abuse offenders. Id.
120. Id. This development was first seen with the juvenile and family courts that had
emerged during the Progressive Era. "The basic goal of these courts was to preserve the
family, act in the best interests of the child, and offer a curative rather than punitive
approach to family problems." PLECV, supra note 25, at 126 (emphasis added).
121. Thomas, supra note 29, at 312; see also AMERICAN HUMANE Ass'N, HUMANE Dmnac-
TORY, (1942) (listing SPCC agencies).
122. See generally PLECK, supra note 25, at 126; Thomas, supra note 29, at 312-13
(describing the growth and decline of SPCC groups).
123. Thomas, supra note 29, at 312.
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tect that home rather than to prosecute the parents and remove
the child."1 2 4 Many members of the emerging professions of
child psychology and social work supported this new
philosophy.125
Accompanying this change in philosophy was the gradual de-
cline in numbers of private institutions that took in abused and
neglected children. 126 By the 1930s and 1940s, many child-pro-
tection services had been assumed by public agencies. 127 Exam-
ples of new public programs included the Mother's Aid
movement and the Aid to Dependent Children program under
the Social Security Act of 1935.128 The Social Security Act offered
federal funds to the states on a matching basis to support chil-
dren whose parents were "disabled, absent, dead, or in
prison."1 29 The Act also encouraged the states to develop pro-
tective programs for dependent, neglected, and delinquent
children.'l 0
Later, the Golden Anniversary White House Conference on
Children and Youth recommended "that the states enact legisla-
tion requiring that social agencies receive complaints of child
neglect and provide services to parents and children."113  That
recommendation was later enacted as part of the 1962 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act.1
3 2
Consequently, because of the extensions and expansions of
child welfare services, "the need to remove children from their
homes by institutional commitments for protective reasons" has
declined, and state and county welfare agencies provided neces-
sary services in the homes of the recipient families.'33 During
the earlier part of the twentieth century, many of the neglect
petitions were not initiated by individuals, but rather by institu-
tional petitioners such as welfare agencies, probation officers,
124. Id.
125. Id. at 312-13.
126. Id. at 313.
127. Id.
128. Thomas, supra note 29, at 313.
129. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-26 (1970)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The 1962 amendments "required each state to develop a plan to extend
child welfare services, including protective services, to every political subdivision. Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 625).
133. Thomas, supra note 29, at 327.
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and schools."' Further, most of the children involved were
young, and many of their families had experienced governmen-
tal involvement in their lives because of poverty, lack of skills,
and lack of significant formal education." 5
G. The 1950s and Thereafter
A third and final reform epoch regarding dependent and ne-
glected children occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.136 Not only
was this a watershed era for the juvenile court system, which ex-
perienced a due process revolution with respect to juvenile court
procedures, 137 but this era also saw a renewed interest in ad-
dressing the needs of dependent and neglected children. 3 As
with earlier eras of reform, the fear of violent crime in the 1950s
stimulated a rediscovery of family violence and a search for more
effective means to address the problems of violence, depen-
dency, and neglect.1 39
Social workers in the 1950s and 1960s began to reject tradi-
tional case work methods. Instead, the social workers started vis-
iting clients at home, at school, and at community centers and
also started offering concrete services as well as psychiatric coun-
seling.140 This so-called "aggressive casework" recognized that
the social welfare agencies could intervene in family matters and
indeed, had a right to intervene, even if uninvited.' Those who
worked with abused and neglected children suggested that the
child welfare department in each state should first investigate
neglect, abuse, and abandonment and then either offer social
services or notify the police.
14 2
134. Id. at 328.
135. Id.
136. PLECK, supra note 25, at 4.
137. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (holding that juveniles may
voluntarily and knowingly waive their Constitutional right to an attorney); Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to juvenile courts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (hold-
ing that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt when juveniles are
charged with adult crimes); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the Consti-
tutional guarantee of due process applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings). See also
Gary A. Debele, The Due Process Revolution and the Juvenile Court: The Matter of Race in the
Historical Evolution of a Doctrine, 5 LAw & INEQ. J. 513, 514-15 (1987).
138. PLECK, supra note 25, at 164.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 166 (referring to a report of the United States Children's Bureau).
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Small groups of reformers, including lawyers, social workers,
physicians, and government workers, raised child abuse and ne-
glect as national issues and expanded the resources available to
provide investigative and social services.14 Because many of
these reformers believed that criminal sanctions against parents
only worsened domestic difficulties, few reformers invoked the
existing cruelty statutes. 14 4 The nonpunitive reporting mandates
enacted in most states from 1963 to 1967 raised the issue of child
abuse and encouraged a response.
1 45
Indeed, the 1960s marked the first time in a century that the
complex problems related to protecting children from physical
maltreatment by their own parents attracted widespread public
interest.146 But this renewed interest was accompanied by a pre-
viously unknown emphasis on analyzing the source of the prob-
lem and offering more than simply punishment.
47
At the turn of the century, juvenile delinquency and institu-
tional reform had been the primary concerns, and programs
were designed to protect children from poverty and the per-
ceived evils of the values held by the newly industrialized soci-
ety.' 48 By the 1950s and 1960s, after unsuccessful attempts to
reactivate the earlier law-enforcement approach with its swift
and sure punishment of abusive parents,1 49 most of the active
reformers embraced the social workers' approach from earlier in
the century 50 and emphasized a cause and effect analysis and
treatment rather than punishment.' 51 The result was the enact-
143. PLECK, supra note 25, at 164. Perhaps no group of reformers was more instru-
mental in addressing the needs of dependent and neglected children in the 1950s and
1960s than the members of the medical profession. Id. at 166-75; Thomas, supra note
29, at 329. In 1962, several physicians published an article about the battered child
syndrome in the Journal of the American Medical Association. C. Henry Kempe et al., The
Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 105 (1962). The battered child syndrome is "a
clinical condition in young children who have received serious physical abuse" and is a
frequent cause of permanent injury or death. Id. The article was a critical part of the
movement toward enacting mandatory child abuse reporting laws that would require
various professionals to report evidence of child abuse and neglect. PLECK, supra note
25, at 167-70. The x-ray machine was enlisted to assist in the detection of symptoms of
abuse not visible to the naked eye. Id. at 166-67.
144. PLECK, supra note 25, at 173.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 173-74; Thomas, supra note 29, at 328.
148. PLECK, supra note 25, at 173-74.
149. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
151. PLEcK, supra note 25, at 173-74.
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ment of child abuse reporting laws and support for the idea that
protective services offered to a family in its own home was usually
a sufficient way to protect the child.
152
The last era of interest and reform regarding the treatment of
dependent and neglected children ultimately resulted from the
re-emergence of the tension inherent in this area of social pol-
icy. Choices had to made between treatment and punishment,
between intervention and abstention, and between ensuring pa-
rental liberties and protecting children. 15  Greater state inter-
vention, part of a trend begun at least as far back as the Civil
War,15 1 was here to stay. The states increased the services and
protection available to dependent, abused, and neglected chil-
dren.' 55 Also, the years following the 1950s and the civil rights
movement saw an increase in awareness and protection of indi-
vidual rights, raising greater apprehension of state interfer-
ence. 156 Reformers were ultimately forced to recognize that
state intervention produced negative as well as positive results,
and often a little of both.
15 7
Minnesota's experience and current CHIPS statute reflect this
long history of development and change in the concepts of the
family and children and in the role of the state in addressing the
needs of dependent and neglected children.
III. MINNESOTA'S STATUTORY HISTORY
In much the same manner that other states across the country
reflected the social movements occurring on a national level,
Minnesota also began early in the twentieth century to specifi-
cally address the needs of dependent and neglected children.
A. Early Minnesota Legislative and Program Developments
Minnesota's original neglect statute, enacted in 1905, reflects
the broad and sweeping powers found in other states at the turn
of the century.15s A child could be removed for undefined rea-
152. Id.; Thomas, supra note 29, at 332.
153. PLEcy, supra note 25, at 181.
154. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
155. PLECK, supra note 25, at 181.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
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sons of parental unfitness, including poverty in a variety of
forms. 159
Even these early statutes reflect the debate over whether it was
the responsibility of the state or the family to protect or punish
dependent and neglected children.160 While recognizing the au-
thority and control of the state through its courts, the 1905 stat-
utes specifically allowed any reputable person to file a petition
alleging that a child was neglected or dependent as long as that
person resided in the county and knew of the child who ap-
peared to be neglected or dependent.161 The statute clearly
drew from the long history, extending back to the colonial era
and continuing into the nineteenth century, of permitting any
interested person in the community to alert authorities to
problems involving children and to initiate the process for ad-
dressing the problems.
1 62
Although they provided few procedural protections for chil-
dren, these early statutes nevertheless recognized the interrela-
tionship between the authority and discretion of the court
system and the general responsibility of families to police their
own members and bring appropriate matters to the attention of
the court system for proper resolution. When compared with
the other provisions of the 1905 statutes, the provision permit-
ting any reputable person to bring a matter before the court
highlights the controversy over whether the responsibility to ad-
dress the needs of dependent and neglected children should
rest on the family or on society through its government and
courts.
Similar to the statutes enacted in other states at the turn of
the century,1 63 the early dependency and neglect statutes in Min-
nesota reveal a struggle to define exactly what a "dependent" or
"neglected" child was, or should be, and to define the circum-
stances under which non-delinquent behavior by children
should be brought before the court."6
159. Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 7, 1905 MINN. GEN. LAws 418, 421.
160. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
161. Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 4, 1905 MINN. GEN. LAws 418, 419-20.
162. See supra part II.
163. See supra note 108.
164. The 1905 statute defined "dependent child" and "neglected child" as follows:
[A] ny child who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or de-
pendent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care or
guardianship; or who habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living
in any house of ill fame or with any vicious or disreputable persons, or whose
1994]
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The early definition of "dependent" and "neglected" children
continued through the 1909 amendments to the statute.1 65 In
1913 the term "habitually truant" appeared for the first time in
the juvenile court statutes, but only in the definition of delin-
quent child and not in the definition of "neglected" and "depen-
dent" child.166
Significant legislative changes occurred during the 1917 legis-
lative session. Writing for the first issue of the Minnesota Law
Review, Judge Edward F. Waite of the Hennepin County Juvenile
Court stated: "We live in what has been aptly termed 'the century
of the child.' Never before have the obligations of society to its
more helpless members been so generally recognized; and of all
forms of helplessness that of childhood makes the strongest and
most universal appeal." 167 Before describing the new legislative
changes, Judge Waite listed the impressive accomplishments that
the state of Minnesota had achieved in addressing the needs of
dependent and neglected children: creation of a reform school
for youthful offenders, schools for the deaf and blind, the juve-
nile courts in 1905, a state hospital for crippled children in 1907,
and "mothers' pensions" in 1913.168 These programs largely re-
flect the developments occurring in other states during the pro-
gressive era, as previously discussed.
169
In 1912, a group called the Minnesota Child Welfare Commis-
sion was appointed by Governor Burnquist to recommend revi-
sions to state laws affecting children.1 70 Among the proposals
home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parents,
guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such a
child; and any child under the age of ten (10) years who is found begging,
peddling or selling any articles or singing or playing any musical instrument
upon the street, or giving any public entertainment, or who accompanies or is
used in aid of any person so doing.
Act of Apr. 19, 1905, ch. 285, § 1, 1905 MINN. GEN. LAws 418, 418 ("an act to regulate
the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children").
165. SeeAct of Apr. 17, 1909, ch. 232, § 1, 1909 MINN. GEN. LAws 269, 269. ("An act
for the appointment of guardians for dependent, neglected and delinquent children
and for the proceeding against persons at fault for such dependency, neglect or
delinquency").
166. Act of Apr. 11, 1913, ch. 260, § 2, 1913 MIN. GEN. LAws 356, 357 (amending
Chapter 232 of the General Laws of Minnesota for the year 1909). The term "habitually
truant" remained in the delinquency statute until the statutes of 1988, some 75 years
later. See Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, § 3, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031, 1033-34.
167. Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. REv. 48, 48 (1917).
168. Id. at 48-49.
169. See supra part II.E.
170. Waite, supra note 167, at 51.
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were laws to regulate midwives, improvements in the educational
scheme, review of the child labor laws, provisions for the specific
guardianship by the state over illegitimate children, and laws to
assist in establishing paternity and holding fathers accountable
for their children. 7 ' Some modification to the delinquency laws
was also proposed.172
With regard to dependent and neglected children, Judge
Waite offered proposals that strongly favored a modern social
work approach over the institutional approach which had domi-
nated the treatment of dependent and neglected children
throughout much of the nineteenth century. 7 ' Judge Waite
wrote,
So also as to children born in wedlock but orphaned, aban-
doned or neglected; the state has no higher obligation than
to discover and supply their need. This means, of course, del-
egation by law of duty and authority to persons through
whom alone the functions of government can be
exercised....
... Obviously there should be supplied a link between the
sovereign state and the needy child. To this end it is pro-
posed to provide for public guardians whose duty it shall be
to safeguard the interests of children who are proper subjects
of the state's protecting care. They may serve as legal guardi-
ans, appointed by the courts, in appropriate cases; but their
peculiar function will be to take the initiative in all that
should be done for the welfare of dependent, neglected and
defective children, many of whom now suffer because their
welfare is 'nobody's business."
74
So began the Minnesota Legislature's efforts to modernize the
state's treatment of neglected, dependent, and abused children.
Minnesota, as one of the Progressive states, was certainly in the
vanguard of reform trends in the early 1900s.1
75
171. Id. at 53-56.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 57-59. See also supra part II.D.,E.
174. Waite, supra note 167, at 57-59.
175. See supra part II.E.
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B. Distinguishing "Dependent" and "Neglected" Children in the
Progressive Era
For the first time, in 1917, the Legislature attempted to distin-
guish between "dependent children" and "neglected chil-
dren.1 176 The Legislature applied the terms "neglected" and
"dependent" to children under the age of eighteen rather than
under the age of seventeen, thereby expanding the court's juris-
diction to address the needs of these children. 177 In addition,
the statute distinguished these terms and defined a dependent
child as:
[A] child who is illegitimate; or whose parents, for good cause,
desire to be relieved of his care and custody; or who is with-
out a parent or lawful guardian able to adequately provide for
his support, training and education, and is unable to main-
tain himself by lawful employment, except such children as
are herein defined as "neglected" or "delinquent".17
The statute separately defined a "neglected child" as:
[A] child who is abandoned by both parents, or, if one parent
is dead, by the survivor, or by his guardian; or who is found
living with vicious or disreputable persons, or whose home, by
reason of improvidence, neglect, cruelty, or depravity on the
part of the parents, guardian or other person in whose care
he may be, is an unfit place for such child; or whose parents
or guardian neglect and refuse, when able to do so, to pro-
vide medical, surgical or other remedial care necessary for his
health or wellbeing; or, when such child is so defective in
mind as to require the custodial care and training of the state
school for the feeble-minded, neglect and refuse to make ap-
plication for his admission to said institution; or who, being
under the age of twelve years, is found begging, peddling or
selling any articles or singing or playing any musical instru-
ment upon the street, or giving any public entertainment, or
who accompanies or is used in aid of any person so doing.
1 79
Thus, under the 1917 legislation, the distinction between "de-
pendent" and "neglected" children was made for the first time in
176. Act of Apr. 20, 1917, ch. 397, § 1, 1917 MINN. GEN. LAws 561, 561-62 ("An act to
consolidate, codify and amend the laws providing for juvenile courts, defining their
jurisdiction and powers over dependent, neglected and delinquent children under the
age of eighteen years and over persons contributing to such neglect or
delinquency...").
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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such a way as to reflect the view that a "dependent" child needed
the state's assistance, help and care. A "neglected" child, on the
other hand, needed help as a result of abusive actions or neglect
inflicted upon the child by his or her parents. These definitions,
particularly the definition of "dependent" child, illustrate the in-
creasing role of the social worker's approach to addressing the
needs of dependent and neglected children, rather than a puni-
tive law and order approach. 180 Much of the language and dis-
tinctions between the categories of dependent and neglected
children continued up to the 1988 legislation establishing the
"Child in Need of Protection or Services" categories.
Consistent with the nineteenth century methods of addressing
the needs of dependent and neglected children,1 81 the 1917
modifications to the Minnesota statutes provided little proce-
dural protection for children or their parents. These modifica-
tions, however, did not disturb the ability of any reputable
resident to bring a matter involving a dependent or neglected
child before the court on a petition and affidavit that would in-
cur the broad dispositional authority of the juvenile court.1 8 2 No
county attorney or other governmental agency was required to
bring these matters before the court."8 ' This trend followed the
long history of permitting the state to enforce and report child
abuse and neglect, while, at the same time, permitting other
members of the community, from the clergy, to neighbors, to
friends and relatives, to intervene.
184
These early statutes drew from the recommendations of the
1909 White House Conference on Children, indicating that laws
addressing the needs of children should be liberally construed
to effectuate their purpose.1 85 As discussed previously, this con-
ference also favored keeping children in their homes and en-
couraged the protection of the home rather than the
prosecution of the parents. 186 As stated in the 1913 statute, the
intent of the statute was that "the care, custody and discipline of
a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should
be given by its parents, and in all cases where it can properly be
180. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
181. See supra part II.D. and accompanying text.
182. Act. of Apr. 20, 1917, ch. 397, § 7, 1917 MINN. GEN. LAws 561, 564.
183. Id. § 1, at 564.
184. See BREMNER, supra note 43, at 351-52.
185. See MINN. STAT. § 8686-4 (1927); MINN. STAT. § 7175 (1913).
186. See Thomas, supra note 29, at 312.
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done, the child [is] to be placed in an approved family home and
become a member of the family by legal adoption or other-
wise." '187 This philosophical statement that children should re-
main in their home or in a reasonable facsimile of their home
has continued through and beyond the significant 1988 legisla-
tive modifications. 8
Minnesota's 1917 legislative session marked a watershed pe-
riod in addressing the needs of dependent and neglected chil-
dren. Progressive notions for addressing these needs were
enacted into law and would have a dramatic impact on the state
of the law in Minnesota. The 1923 statute continued these
trends and provided that each child was entitled to "the protec-
tion and correction which he needs under the circumstances dis-
closed in the case; and that whenever it is necessary to provide
for him elsewhere than with his parents his care, custody and
discipline shall approximate as nearly as may be that which
ought to be given by his parents."'
8 s9
The purposes and procedures of these early dependency and
neglect statutes remained consistent for decades. 90 Even by
1980, almost fifty years later, the philosophical direction and in-
tent of the law remained the same.1 91 This was true in spite of
the fact that the intent and purpose of the juvenile code was
then to treat delinquent children differently from "neglected"
and "dependent" children.
C. Recent Developments in Minnesota
Minnesota law currently states that the purpose of the laws af-
fecting dependent and neglected children is as follows:
[To] secure for each child.., the care and guidance, prefera-
bly in the child's own home, as will best serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child; ... to
preserve and strengthen the child's family ties whenever pos-
sible ... removing the child from the custody of parents only
when the child's welfare or safety cannot be adequately safe-
guarded without removal; and, when removal from the
child's own family is necessary. . . to secure for the child cus-
187. MINN. STAT. § 7175 (1913).
188. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
189. MINN. STAT. § 8667 (1923).
190. For laws stating analogous purpose and procedures, see Act of Apr. 24, 1959,
ch. 685, 1959 MINN. LAws 1275; Act of Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 192, 1927 MINN. LAws 288.
191. See Act of Apr. 15, 1980, ch. 580, 1980 MINN. LAws 962.
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tody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given by the parents.
192
Although this statute perpetuates the philosophical view that
children should remain in their own home or receive treatment
in their own home, the statute also perpetuates the conflict be-
tween the best interests of the child and the best interests of the
state. This has historically been a constant tension in the treat-
ment of dependent and neglected children, and that tension
continues to this day.1 93 The statute neither defines the interests
of the child and the state, nor indicates the tremendous power
available to the court when addressing the needs of "dependent"
and "neglected" children, nor discusses the wide array of re-
sources available for families and children through the juvenile
court. Yet, this statute makes it clear that the philosophical con-
flicts and philosophical views from the early 1900s remain in the
statutes today.194 Indeed, the history of childhood and the family
has been one of tension between the family and the state, and
between individual family members. 95 Ultimately, the practice
of allowing private individuals to initiate CHIPS proceedings,
thereby invoking the resources and powers of the state without
the approval of county attorneys or welfare agencies, raises this
age-old tension in our world today.
While it may have been unintentional, the Legislature in 1985
highlighted this long-standing tension when it amended the pur-
pose section of the CHIPS statutes. 196  The amendment stated
that the purposes of the statutes affecting "dependent" and "ne-
glected" children were to serve the best interests of the state and
"to provide judicial procedures which protect the welfare of the
child."' 97
In 1988, the Legislature eliminated the terms "dependent"
and "neglected" and created the phrase: "Child in Need of Pro-
tection or Services."' 98 As a result, these children are referred to
as "CHIPS" children.1 99 However, in amending the statute, the
192. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1992).
193. See generally Thomas, supra note 29.
194. See Act of Apr. 15, 1980, ch. 580, § 3, 1980 MINN. LAws 962, 966; see also supra
notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
195. See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 53.
196. See Act of May 31, 1985, ch. 286, 1985 MINN. LAws 1299.
197. Id. § 1.
198. See Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, § 2, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031, 1032-33.
199. Id.
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Legislature did not make any substantive changes to the "title,
intent and construction" provision in the purpose section of the
juvenile code. Rather, the definitional section of the CHIPS stat-
ute was merely amended to replace the terms "dependent child"
and "neglected child" with the term "Child in Need of Protec-
tion or Services. ' 20 0 No other changes were made in the pur-
pose section,2 0 1 and because changes in terminology alone could
not resolve the conflict between the state's interests and the best
interests of the child, the conflict remains.
In defining "Child in Need of Protection or Services," after
restating the purpose of those statutes as being exactly the same
as the purpose of the "dependency" and "neglect" statutes which
preceded it,20 2 the Legislature essentially rewrote the jurisdic-
tional elements of the old "dependency" and "neglect" statutes.
The new language is not only more specific, but also includes
within the statutory definition of CHIPS certain categories, such
as petty matter violations and delinquency violations committed
by a child under age of ten, that previously were contained
within the delinquency statutes.20 3
As stated more clearly in Juvenile Law and Practice.
200. Id.
201. Id. The 1988 CHIPS law provided that:
Subd. 2. The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for
each child alleged or adjudicated in need of protection or services and under
the jurisdiction of the court, the care and guidance, preferably in the child's
own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare
of the child and the best interests of the state; to provide judicial procedures
which protect the welfare of the child; to preserve and strengthen the child's
family ties whenever possible, removing the child from the custody of parents
only when the child's welfare or safety cannot be adequately safeguarded with-
out removal; and, when removal from the child's own family is necessary, to
secure for the child custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by the parents.
Id.
202. See Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 673, 1988 MINN. LAws 1031.
203. Id. § 3. This section amended MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1986) as follows:
Subd. 2a. CHILD IN NEED OF PROrECTION OR SERVICES. "Child in need of pro-
tection or services" means a child who is in need of protection or services
because the child:
(1) is abandoned or without parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse or resides with a victim of
domestic child abuse as defined in subdivision 24;
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required
care for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the
child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide
that care;
(4) is without the special care made necessary by a physical, mental, or emo-
tional condition because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is un-
able or unwilling to provide that care;
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A careful comparison of the repealed Dependency category
(M.S.A. § 260.015, subd. 6) and the repealed Neglect cate-
gory (M.S.A. § 260.015 subd. 10) with the CHIPS legislation
(M.S.A. § 260.015, subd. 2a) is necessary because the lan-
guage in the CHIPS legislation is not the same and all the
definitions have not been retained. For example, one juris-
dictional category that was not retained from the repealed
Neglect legislation was the provision that stated that a child
was neglected when a delinquent act committed by the child
was in whole or in part a result of parental neglect.
A new jurisdictional category in the CHIPS legislation pro-
vides that a child is in need of protection or services if the
child has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse or resides
with a victim of domestic child abuse as defined by Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 260.015, subd. 24.204
Today, the jurisdictional bases for a finding that a child is a
CHIPS child have been expanded to include even more bases
(5) is medically neglected, which includes, but is not limited to, the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a
life-threatening condition. The term "withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment" means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threat-
ening conditions by providing treatment, including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication which, in the treating physician's
or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be ef-
fective in ameliorating or correcting all conditions, except that the term
does not include the failure to provide treatment other than appropriate
nutrition, hydration, or medication to an infant when, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment:
(i) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(ii) the provision of the treatment would merely prolong dying, not be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threat-
ening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant; or
(iii) the provision of the treatment would be virtually futile in terms of
the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under the circum-
stances would be inhumane;
(6) is one whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause desires
to be relieved of the child's care and custody;
(7) has been placed for adoption or care in violation of law;
(8) is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or
physical disability, or state of immaturity of the child's parent, guardian,
or other custodian;
(9) is one whose occupation, behavior, condition, environment, or associa-
tions are such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others;
(10) has committed a delinquent act before becoming ten years old;
(11) is a runaway; or
(12) is an habitual truant.
Id.
204. 13 JOHN 0. SONSTENG & ROBERT SCOTT, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JUVENILE LAW
AND PRACTICE, Rule 37.01 author's cmt., at 4, 5 (Supp. 1993).
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than provided by the 1988 legislation. 20 -5 The newest definition
adds as bases for a petition those situations where a child is a
victim of emotional abuse or where the parent or custodian ex-
poses the child to criminal activity in the home. 20 6 The basis for
the petition can include: abandonment of a child by a parent or
205. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a (Supp. 1993) now defines a Child in Need of
Protection or Services as follows:
(1) is abandoned or without parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2) (i) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse, or (ii) resides with or
has resided with a victim of domestic child abuse as defined in subdivi-
sion 24, (iii) resides with or would reside with a perpetrator of domestic
child abuse or child abuse as defined in subdivision 28, or (iv) is a victim
of emotional maltreatment as defined in subdivision 5a;
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required
care for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the
child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide
that care;
(4) is without the special care made necessary by a physical, mental, or emo-
tional condition because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is un-
able or unwilling to provide that care;
(5) is medically neglected, which includes, but is not limited to, the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a
life-threatening condition. The term "withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment" means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threat-
ening conditions by providing treatment, including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication which, in the treating physician's
or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be ef-
fective in ameliorating or correcting all conditions, except that the term
does not include the failure to provide treatment other than appropriate
nutrition, hydration, or medication to an infant when, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment:
(i) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(ii) the provision of the treatment would merely prolong dying, not be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threat-
ening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant; or
(iii) the provision of the treatment would be virtually futile in terms of
the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under the circum-
stances would be inhumane;
(6) is one whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause desires
to be relieved of the child's care and custody;
(7) has been placed for adoption or care in violation of law;
(8) is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or
physical disability, or state of immaturity of the child's parent, guardian,
or other custodian;
(9) is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injuri-
ous or dangerous to the child or others. An injurious or dangerous envi-
ronment may include, but is not limited to, the exposure of a child to
criminal activity in the child's home;
(10) has committed a delinquent act before becoming ten years old;
(11) is a runaway;
(12) is an habitual truant; or
(13) is one whose custodial parent's parental rights to another child have
been involuntarily terminated within the past five years.
Id.
206. Id.
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guardian; physical or sexual abuse or emotional maltreatment of
a child; denial of appropriate food, clothing, shelter, education,
or medical care; a parent's desire for "good cause," to be re-
lieved of parental care and responsibility; the placement of a
child for adoption in violation of the law; the lack of proper care
for the child because of the parent's emotional, medical, or
physical disability or inability to prevent an injurious or danger-
ous environment; the commission of a delinquent act by child
who is under age ten or is a runaway or habitual truant; or the
involuntary termination of the parent's parental rights to an-
other child within the past four years.2 7 Physical and sexual
abuse are also defined more expansively.
20 8
While the bases for filing a CHIPS petition have been ex-
panded, the historical shift away from the punitive approach to
the social worker's approach to the needs of dependent and ne-
glected children has continued into the most recent statutory
amendments. While indicating that the paramount considera-
tion in these proceedings is the best interests of the child, with-
out defining specifically what "best interests of the child" means,
the statute goes on to reiterate the necessity of securing for each
child the care and guidance as will best serve the spiritual, emo-
tional, mental, and physical welfare of the child.20 9 This care is
to be provided in the child's own home, or if it is not possible for
the child to remain in his or her home, in a setting that resem-
bles as closely as possible that which would exist in his or her
own home.210
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1992).
210. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2(a) (1992) provides:
The paramount consideration in all proceedings concerning a child alleged or
found to be in need of protection or services is the best interests of the child.
In proceedings involving an American Indian child, as defined in section
257.351, subdivision 6, the best interests of the child must be determined con-
sistent with sections 257.35 to 257.3579 and the Indian Child Welfare Act,
United States Code, title 25, sections 1901 to 1923. The purpose of the laws
relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each child alleged or adjudicated in
need of protection or services and under the jurisdiction of the court, the care
and guidance, preferably in the child's own home, as will best serve the spiri-
tual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child; to provide judicial
procedures which protect the welfare of the child; to preserve and strengthen
the child's family ties whenever possible and in the child's best interests, re-
moving the child from the custody of parents only when the child's welfare or
safety cannot be adequately safe-guarded without removal; and, when removal
from the child's own family is necessary and in the child's best interests, to
secure for the child custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by the parents.
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In addition to this emphasis on home-like services and a
nonpunitive treatment approach, the statute now directs the
court and the personnel of the court to ensure that reasonable
efforts are made "to reunite the child with the child's family at
the earliest possible time consistent with the best interests, safety,
and protection of the child."'211 Reasonable efforts mean:
the exercise of due diligence by the responsible social service
agency to use appropriate and available services to meet the
needs of the child and the child's family in order to prevent
removal of the child from the child's family; or upon re-
moval, services to eliminate the need for removal and reunite
the family.
212
This statement is so strong that it imposes on the social service
agency the burden of demonstrating that it has in fact made all
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
213
As this review of legislative developments indicates, Minnesota
has clearly been following the trends, begun early in American
history, in addressing the needs of dependent and neglected
children. The state has moved away from the punitive approach
that treated dependency and neglect as distinct situations where
parental behavior was the focus and punishment and removal of
children was the remedy. Minnesota is moving more and more
toward the social worker approach where dependent, neglected,
and abused children receive treatment and therapy under the
direction of social workers in a unified CHIPS statutory regime,
which emphasizes the best interests of the children, reunifica-
tion or maintenance of an intact family and home, and broad-
ened bases for filing a CHIPS petition.214
Significantly, the conflict continues to exist between the na-
ture of the use of the state's power through its courts, welfare
systems, and county attorney's office and the recognition of the
ongoing responsibility of communities and families to address
the needs of dependent and neglected children. 5 As stated,
Id.
211. MINN. STAT. § 260.012(a) (1992).
212. Id. § 260.012(b) (1992).
213. Id.
214. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). All of this has occurred in a time of more elabo-
rate procedural mechanisms and in a post-Gault era when due process is a considera-
tion in child protection matters. See id. at 26. At the same time, the juvenile code has
continued to provide the juvenile court with broad dispositional bases and authority
over children and families. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.181, 260.191 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
215. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
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even after all of the legislative changes discussed in this section,
the CHIPS petition process continues to allow any reputable per-
son to file a CHIPS petition in the juvenile court on behalf of a
child in need of services. 16 This practice of community involve-
ment in protecting the welfare of society's children has its roots
in colonial America and nineteenth century developments.
17
Although some counties and courts require that the county at-
torney "draft" all CHIPS petitions, the statutes perpetuate the
trend of historical access to the court by any reputable person on
behalf of the community or the child.2 8 As will be discussed in
greater detail below, such broad access to the juvenile court for
the filing of a CHIPS petition by any interested person is critical
to the usefulness and effectiveness of the CHIPS system which
was intended to benefit an increasingly troubled society.
IV. CHILD IN NEED OF PROTECTION OR SERVICES OR CHIPS
PROCEEDING
In addition to significant historical developments in the treat-
ment of dependent, neglected, and abused children, the proce-
dures in the juvenile courts, where CHIPS petitions are now
filed, have also evolved in numerous ways over the years. The
procedural developments are as important as the substantive de-
velopments in assessing private CHIPS petitions.
A. The Development of Policies and Procedures for Juveniles
Constitutional principles such as due process and equal pro-
tection were not applied to the early juvenile court proceedings,
even in the delinquency area. Rather, the juvenile court was, as
stated by a referee in the California juvenile court in 1923, "con-
ceived in the spirit of the clinic." 921  Described as child centered,
the juvenile courts were specifically designed to operate with
great informality.22 ° The intent and goal of the juvenile court
216. MINN. STAT. § 260.131, subd. 1 (1992).
217. See BREMNER, supra note 43, at 263-281.
218. MINN. STAT. § 260.131 (1992).
219. ERNEST B. HOAG & EDWARD H. WILLIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE
LAw, 158 (1923).
220. MONRAD G. PAULSON & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVE-
NILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-4 (1978). Prior to In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), and other similar developments in the 1960s, neither juries,
nor public trials, nor other constitutional guarantees existed, even in the "criminal"
cases. Id. at 14. Court records, assuming they even existed, were generally sealed and
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system was to take a broad humanitarian outlook towards the
child.221 Judges were expected to be not only well versed in the
law, but also well versed in psychology, sociology, and child de-
velopment since it was the judge who ultimately decided what
would serve the best interests of both the child and the state.222
As noted by one early commentator, "the juvenile court is con-
spicuously a response to the modern spirit of socialjustice. ' ' 223 It
was within the context of this spirit and with the view of children
as entities to be molded by appropriate middle class values that
the "neglected" or "dependent" child was to be viewed and
helped.
Author Herbert Lou made this observation about the early
functioning of juvenile court:
It is perhaps the first legal tribunal where law and science,
especially the science of medicine and those sciences which
deal with human behavior, such as biology, sociology, and
psychology, work side by side. It recognizes the fact that the
law unaided is incompetent to decide what is adequate treat-
ment of delinquency and crime. It undertakes to define and
readjust social situations without the sentiment of prejudice.
Its approach to the problem which the child presents is scien-
tific, objective, and dispassionate. The methods which it uses
are those of social case work, in which every child is studied
and treated as an individual. 24
Into this milieu of philosophical views entered the concepts of
the "dependent" and "neglected" child. The notions of equal
protection, due process, and other Constitutional rights, how-
ever, directly conflicted with these philosophical views and with
the original intention of the framers of the juvenile court
movement.
22 5
These philosophical views, combined with the significant
power and discretion given to juvenile courtjudges to invade the
not available to the public or even to the parties, with the stated basis being to safe-
guard the child's reputation. Id. at 24.
221. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
222. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See PAULSON & WHITEBRFAD, supra note 221, at 10-12. Historically, juvenile of-
fenders were not given the same due process protections as adult offenders. Id. at 12.
In fact, constitutional issues in juvenile court proceedings were not addressed until
1966, sixty-six years after the firstJuvenile Court Act. Id. at 12-13.
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lives of children and their families,226 led to several important
United States Supreme Court decisions. In these decisions, the
Court determined that, in particular circumstances, the due pro-
cess clause and concepts of fundamental fairness must override
the conflicting philosophical views of the juvenile court. 27
While these United States Supreme Court decisions specifi-
cally applied to delinquency procedures in the juvenile court,
their ramifications in the application of constitutional principles
to all aspects of juvenile court cannot be overstated. More spe-
cifically, in Minnesota the decisions resulted in a movement to
create procedural rules and rights for all juvenile court proceed-
ings, including child protection matters. 228 In some instances,
the creation of rules of procedure not only systematized the pro-
cedure used in the court, but also created or clarified substantive
rights under the juvenile court statutes and applied significant
constitutional principles. 29
In the late 1960s, the structure of Minnesota's juvenile courts
was determined by each individual county.2 30 In Hennepin and
Ramsey Counties, the two most populous counties in the state,
separate juvenile courts existed on a district court level.23 1 Each
of these courts was effectively run by and controlled by a judge
who had been seated as the one and only juvenile court judge
for a number of years. To enhance the participant's understand-
ing of the juvenile court process and to provide more protection
forjuveniles and parents, these judges suggested that procedural
rules incorporating due process and equal protection considera-
tions be created.232
In the other eighty-five counties of Greater Minnesota, juve-
nile courtjudges were special judges who heard specific jurisdic-
226. Id. at 12-22.
227. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555
(1966). See supra note 137.
228. MINN. R.P. FOR Juv. CT. PROCEEDINGS IN PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1970)
(codified as adopted at MINN. R. Juv. P. 52 (1982)).
229. Id. at 2-1, 2-3. Rule 2-1 states that "[ejach party to ajuvenile court cause shall
have the right to be represented by counsel . . ." Id. at 2-1. Under Rule 2-3, juveniles
have the right to introduce evidence on their behalf, cross-examine witnesses, inspect
reports filed with the court, obtain transcripts, appeal decisions, and have subpoenas
issued. Id. at 2-3.
230. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 1 (1965).
231. Id., subds. 2, 3.
232. Id.
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233tional cases. The statutes governing the juvenile courts
contained no statutory authority empowering the judges to cre-
ate their own specific rules applicable to juvenile court proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, in 1969, the Minnesota Probate CourtJudges
Association, which consisted of all of the judges who heard juve-
nile court cases in the eighty-five counties of Greater Minnesota,
passed and approved procedural rules for juvenile court pro-
ceedings.23 4 They agreed to apply those rules while exercising
their jurisdiction as juvenile court judges.23 5
For many reasons, including the high volume ofjuvenile cases
in the metropolitan area, the Hennepin and Ramsey County
Judges neither approved these rules nor agreed to abide by
them.23 6 These judges then created their own set of procedural
rules for application within Hennepin and Ramsey counties.237
Thus, from 1969 to 1983, the procedural rules applicable to the
participants in ajuvenile court proceeding varied by county. Be-
cause there were differences in the procedural rights given to
juveniles, and because these procedural rights at times had a sig-
nificant impact on the underlying substantive rights, the rights
of a juvenile or an adult in a dependency or neglect proceeding
were determined by the county in which the case was venued.
While each of these two sets of rules purported to be only pro-
cedural in nature, the reality is that they did grant substantive
rights.23 8 In particular, the rules in Greater Minnesota specifi-
cally delineated certain rights including the right to counsel,
23 9
the right to remain silent,24 ° and other basic rights. 241 The Hen-
nepin and Ramsey County rules incorporated some specific
233. Id., subd. 4. In most instances, these judges acted simultaneously as probate
court judges and juvenile court judges and also had jurisdiction over minor criminal
offenses and smaller value civil cases. Id.
234. MINN. R.P. FOR JUV. CT. PROCEEDINGS IN PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS 531-32
(1970) (codified as adopted at MINN. R. Juv. P. 52 (1982)).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 531.
237. For Hennepin County's version of juvenile court rules of procedure at this
time, see HENNEPIN COUNTYJUV. CT. BENCH BOOK, HENNEPINJUV. CT. R. 49-54 (4th ed.
1977).
238. See, e.g., id. at 6.2 (giving juveniles the right to counsel).
239. MINN. R.P. FORJUV. CT. PROCEEDINGS IN PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS 2-1 (1970)
(codified as adopted at MINN. R Juv. P. 52 (1982)).
240. Id. at 2-2.
241. Id. at 2-3.
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guarantees within other rules,2 42 but they did not contain a sepa-
rate division for rights of the children. Thus, substantive rights,
such as right to counsel and the right to remain silent, were
much more explicitly spelled out in the Greater Minnesota pro-
bate and juvenile court rules.
At the same time, the Hennepin County rules specifically ad-
dressed discovery issues.2 43  The procedural rules used by the
counties of Greater Minnesota did not address discovery issues
and did not interrelate with the procedural rules from other
courts.
Regarding the reference of juveniles for prosecution as adults,
the metropolitan rules required a finding of probable cause and,
if necessary, allowed that determination to be made upon the
taking of testimony.24" The metropolitan rules also specified
time periods within which the finding of probable cause had to
be made.245 In contrast, the probate and juvenile court rules for
juvenile court proceedings in Greater Minnesota were much
more detailed in their description of what kind of reference
hearing would be held, what kind of investigation would be
done,246 what kind of notice would be given,247 what kind of evi-
dence would be admissible,248 and what kind of order would be
issued.249
B. The Emergence of Uniform Procedure Throughout the State
In 1982, the Minnesota Legislature authorized the creation of
procedural rules that would apply to all juvenile court proceed-
242. See HENNEPIN COUNTYJUV. CT. BENCH BOOK, HENNEPINJUV. CT. R. 2.1, 6.2, 7.1.
Rule 2.1 guarantees parental notification; Rule 6.2 guarantees the right to a public
defender; and Rule 7.1 guarantees the right to an appeal.
243. Id. at 6.61. Rule 6.61 states that "[a]ll dependency and neglect discovery will be
governed by Rules 26 through 37 inclusive of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure."
Id.
244. Id. at 4.3. This rule states that when a reference motion is made, the court
must determine that "there is probable cause to believe that the child is involved in the
offense for which the motion is made." Id.
245. Id. at 4.1. Rule 4.1 states that "[a] motion for reference . . . must be made
before jeopardy attaches to the offense sought to be referred." Id.
246. MINN. R.P. FORJUV. CT. PROCEEDINGS IN PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS 8-3 (1970)
(codified as adopted at MINN. R. Juv. P. 52 (1982)).
247. Id. at 8-2.
248. Id. at 8-6.
249. Id. at 8-7.
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ings within the state.25 ° Thus, effective May 1, 1983, the first uni-
form Rules of Juvenile Procedure were created.251 These rules
continue to govern the procedures in juvenile court.
25 2
The committee that created these rules divided them into the
categories of "delinquency rules"25 3 and 'juvenile protection
rules."254 The 'juvenile protection rules" were intended to gov-
ern juvenile protection matters which were defined to include
cases of dependency and neglect, children neglected in foster
care, termination of parental rights, and review of all out-of-
home placements. 255 Thus, some eight decades after the crea-
tion of the statutory definitions for "dependent" and "neglected"
children, 256 and the coming together of the various philosophi-
cal views within the context of a very powerful court system,
2 7
there was now for the first time a set of specific procedural rules
that applied to all juvenile court cases.
The framers of the newjuvenile court rules created two sets of
rules because they wanted to distinguish delinquency cases,
where the criminal nature of the delinquent acts invokes proce-
dural and substantive rights, 2 158 from juvenile protection mat-
ters, 259 where other doctrines come into play. In creating these
categories, the framers struggled to balance conflicting issues.
On the one side of the balance were the constitutional rights to
due process, equal protection, and right to counsel.26 ° On the
other side of the balance were the philosophical concepts based
on informality, the need for swift proceedings responding to
emergency situations, and the long-held notion of parens pa-
250. The rules were then adopted by order of the Minnesota Supreme Court dated
December 17, 1982. MINN. R. Juv. P. (Supersedure clause).
251. Id. (1984).
252. Id.
253. MINN. R. Juv. P. 1.01 (1984). "Rules 1-35 and 65 govern the procedure in the
juvenile courts of the State of Minnesota for all delinquency matters defined by Minn.
Stat. 260.015, Subd. 5 and all matters defined by Minn. Stat. 260.015, Subds. 19, 20, 21,
22, and 23 which are defined for the purpose of these rules as petty matters." Id.
254. Id. at 37.01. "Rules 37 through 65 govern the procedure for all juvenile protec-
tion matters in the juvenile court of the State of Minnesota. Juvenile protection matters
include all dependency, neglect, neglected and in foster care, termination of parental
rights and review of out of home placement matters." Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
257. PAULSON & WHrrEBREAD, supra note 221, at 6.
258. MINN. R. Juv. P. 1-36 (1984).
259. Id. at 37.01.
260. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
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triae.2 61  In struggling to achieve a balance, the framers at-
tempted to develop a system which would reflect all of those
things.2 12 In doing so, a procedural system unlike any other
within the court system of the State of Minnesota was created.
As an example of the sometimes subtle distinction between
the rules of civil and criminal procedure and the rules of juve-
nile court procedure, rather than being a party to an action, 26' a
person or entity has a "right to participate." 64 Instead of apply-
ing the civil discovery rules265 or the criminal discovery rules,2 66 a
different set of rules applying to pretrial discovery was created.267
At the same time, in an effort to move matters along, time limits
were set within all of the rules to recognize that decisions in chil-
dren's lives need to be made quickly. 68
C. Current CHIPS Procedure
The rules written in 1983 still exist today.2 69 While statutory
changes have occurred, such as the creation of the new CHIPS
category that replaced the categories of dependent and ne-
glected children, the rules themselves have not been amended.
The delicate balance that the relevant statutes and procedural
rules attempt to strike between the power and authority of the
court, the authority of the state to participate in and control
CHIPS proceedings, and the ability of any interested person to
commence CHIPS proceedings, continue to be.issues addressed
in all CHIPS proceedings.
The historical trend of broad community involvement in fam-
ily and child protection matters,27 ° the prosecutorial mode of
the state as parens patriae,271 the social worker's therapy method-
ology that became dominant in this century,272 the due process
261. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
262. MINN. R.Juv. P. 37-65 (1984).
263. See generally MINN. R. CRIM. P. (1984).
264. MINN. R.Juv. P. 39 (1984).
265. MINN. R. Crv. P. 26-37 (1984).
266. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9 (1984).
267. MINN. R. juv. P. 57 (1984).
268, See, e.g., MINN. R.Juv. P. 52, 59, 61, 62 (1984) (stating respective time limits of
"immediate" to be: 72 hours; 120 days; 90 days; and 45 days).
269. MINN. R. Juv. P. (1994).
270. See supra part II.
271. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 120-25, 140-42 and accompanying text.
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concerns of In re Gault,273 and the long tradition of "the republi-
can family" in American history274 all converge in the application
of the juvenile court rules to substantive CHIPS proceedings. It
is a delicate balance fraught with much tension and the over-
arching need to protect the "children's best interests. '27 5 The
right to bring a private CHIPS petition is an integral part of this
procedure and one clearly contemplated by both the substantive
law and procedural rules.
V. WHY PRIVATE CHIPS ARE NEEDED
No other court system in Minnesota has available to it the dis-
positional resources2 76 or the dispositional alternatives 27 7 avail-
able to the juvenile court in CHIPS proceedings. Neither the
family court278 nor the criminal court 279 provide an opportunity
to assist families both financially and dispositionally as does the
juvenile court.
More specifically, no other court has the authority to order
foster care, 28 0 drug treatment, 28 ' residential treatment, 282 indi-
vidual and family counseling,283 psychological and physical
examinations, 284 protected supervision with in-home monitor-
ing,285 or other alternatives that can be used to strengthen and
assist children and families. In addition, no other court system
273. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
274. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
275. See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 53. The best interests of the child are de-
fined by community consensus.
276. Among the various resources available to the juvenile court system are the
county welfare board, foster homes, child placement agencies, physical and mental
health treatment programs, and drug awareness programs. See MINN. STAT. § 260.191,
subd. 1 (1992).
277. Some of the alternatives for children in need of protective services include in-
home placement, transfer of custody, independent living, counseling, and monetary
fines. See id.
278. Family law statutes provide assistance to families through temporary orders, re-
straining orders, and guardians ad litem. MINN. STAT. §§ 518.131, 518.165 (1992).
However, family courts do not have as extensive an assistance program as does the juve-
nile court. See MINN. STAT. § 260.191, subd. 1 (1992).
279. Criminal statutes do not specifically address family assistance, although "reha-
bilitation" is listed as one purpose of the Criminal Code. MINN. STAT. § 609.01, subd. 1
(1992).
280. Id. § 260.191, subd. I(b)(3)(i) (1992).
281. Id., subd. I(b)(6).
282. Id., subd. 1 (a) (3).
283. Id., subd. 1 (b) (1).
284. MINN. STAT. § 260.191, subd. I(a)(3) (1992).
285. Id., subd. 1 (b) (2).
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in Minnesota has the authority to order both parents and chil-
dren to participate in these alternatives.
2 8 6
Finally, the Bureau of Social Services or county welfare depart-
ments participate287 in all CHIPS proceedings and, disposition-
ally, the court has the authority to order financial assistance in
excess of the parents' and childrens' ability to pay for welfare
department programs. 8 This combination of court authority
and financial resources provides the juvenile courts with options
unavailable to any other court in Minnesota.
Despite the historic statutory language discussed above, 289 no
county had rules or special court orders specifying the circum-
stances and the manner in which CHIPS petitions might be
brought by family members or other interested persons, rather
than by the bureau of social services and the county attorney's
office. This absence of any specific court rule or generic court
order and directive resulted in different situations for different
families in different counties. The ability of a family member or
interested person to bring a CHIPS petition depended on the
whim of the judge or, in some cases, the clerk of court charged
with filing such petitions.
Following the passage of the current CHIPS statute, 290 Henne-
pin County, the largest county in the state, through its acting
chief judge of juvenile court, 2 9 took an extremely liberal posi-
tion in providing access to the court by virtually anyone who
wished to file a private CHIPS petition.292
Beginning in February 1991, however, the Hennepin County
court significantly restricted access to the juvenile court through
286. Id., subd. l(b)(1).
287. "The county welfare board has the right to participate in the hearings through
the county attorney." MINN. R. Juv. P. 39.03 (1994).
288. See MINN. STAT. § 260.251 (1992).
289. See supra part III.
290. MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
291. Judge Allan Oleisky was Chief Judge of Hennepin County District Court in
1988.
292. MINN. STAT. § 260.131, subd. 1 (1992) states:
Any reputable person, including but not limited to any agent of the commis-
sioner of human services, having knowledge of a child in this state or of a child
who is a resident of this state, who appears to be delinquent, in need of protec-
tion or services, or neglected and in foster care, may petition the juvenile
court in the manner provided in this section.
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private CHIPS petitions by order dated February 6, 1991.293
Also, in an effort to determine under what specific conditions
private CHIPS petitions should be allowed, the Hennepin
CountyJuvenile Court called together a committee to discuss the
rules to be implemented pursuant to Minnesota Rule 53.01,294
and to begin a process to provide access to the juvenile court on
a more continuous basis despite the rotation of judges.
29 5
At that time, Hennepin County restricted access to the juve-
nile court, excluding all but the narrow pipeline of cases accept-
able to the Hennepin County Welfare Department and the
Hennepin County Attorney's Office. The "narrow pipeline" oc-
curs because welfare departments and county attorneys are
guided by their own internal policies as to what cases they will
accept and on what basis they will accept them. 296 Moreover,
county attorneys are dependent upon the welfare department,
with all of its political and financial restrictions,29 7 for investiga-
tion of CHIPS cases. Thus, the public's access to the juvenile
court can be and has been significantly hampered.298
This restriction severely limited the ability of families in need
of assistance to obtain help through the juvenile court pro-
cess.29 9 Many families and individuals were left without the abil-
ity to provide for the needs of their children, either because of
financial constraints, lack of options and opportunities in the
treatment setting, lack of in-home and available services, or
other restrictions resulting from lack of access to the powerful
and resource rich juvenile court.30 0 This lack of access contra-
293. Order, In reA.V., Hennepin CountyJuvenile Court File No. 148071-96 (Feb. 6,
1991) (dismissing seven pending private CHIPS petitions).
294. Memorandum from Reid S. Raymond, Law Clerk for Judge Isabel Gomez, to
Attorneys in the Private CHIPS Jurisdiction Case (Feb. 25, 1991) (on file with the Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review).
295. Id.
296. Memorandum of Hennepin County Attorney's Office, In re A.V., Hennepin
CountyJuvenile Court File No. 148071-96 (Feb. 6, 1991) (regarding a motion to dismiss
private CHIPS petitions).
297. Id.
298. See Order, In reA.V., Hennepin CountyJuvenile Court File No. 148071-96 (Feb.
6, 1991) (dismissing seven pending private CHIPS petitions and preventing any filing
without specific order or rules of the court).
299. See generally SONSTENG & Sco-rr, supra note 204.
300. See Order, In reA.V., Hennepin CountyJuvenile Court File No. 148071-96 (Feb.
6, 1991) (dismissing seven pending private CHIPS petitions and preventing any filing
without specific order or rules of the court).
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dicts the historical availability of the juvenile courts to help chil-
dren and families who need assistance.
While it can be debated whether or not the resources available
through the court are sufficient to meet the needs and demands
which are put on it by such petitions, the reality is that the juve-
nile court stands in a special position to assist families and chil-
dren in ways and with resources not available through any other
means.
301
Voluntarily working with a welfare department or voluntarily
seeking out treatment and help is often unsuccessful either for
political reasons or financial reasons. Additionally, in Minne-
sota, no other court can order treatment, place children in fos-
ter care, place children in residential treatment, provide
financial assistance and backing for children with significant
needs, or otherwise assist families in working together to resolve
problems as readily as the juvenile court can.
The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on the Ju-
venile Justice System has recently raised a significant issue about
access to the juvenile court system and its rich and various re-
sources, especially by minority persons. °2 This report indicated
that many parents who seek access to the courts and social wel-
fare system to help their children are forced to have their child
adjudicated delinquent before the much needed services become
available to them. 3  One suggestion by the Task Force was to
give juvenile judges the authority to convert delinquency cases to
CHIPS cases.30 4 That approach, however, is backwards in that it
emphasizes delinquency issues rather than child protection is-
sues. In reality, child protection issues often precede delin-
quency issues in the lives of those children who find themselves
in trouble with the law.
A more available private CHIPS procedure is an obvious solu-
tion, allowing a family member or other interested person to ini-
tiate a CHIPS proceeding and gain access to the resources of the
juvenile court without requiring that person to either have the
child adjudicated delinquent or secure the approval of a county
attorney or other county bureaucrat. The private CHIPS peti-
301. See statutes cited supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
302. See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT, rep7inted in 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595 (1994).
303. Id. at 678.
304. Id.
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tion would make the juvenile court's services and protections
available to all members of society, regardless of race, creed, or
socioeconomic status.
A failure to recognize the necessity of having an available ac-
cess point into the juvenile court by families in crisis is a failure
to provide for the very basic needs of children and families. This
failure further destroys the vision of American society, dating
back to the colonial era. During the colonial era, neighbors,
friends, relatives, and the broader community involved them-
selves, albeit reluctantly, in the protection of children.30 5 In the
late nineteenth century, despite the earlier emergence of the
"republican family,"306 child protection issues became the con-
cern of all of society, and private entities such as the cruelty soci-
eties, backed by the state as parens patriae, protected children
when necessary.307 The twentieth century view with its emphases
on therapy rather than prosecution and punitive actions308 and
keeping children in their homes and communities30 9 depends
more than ever on individual initiative. In our troubled late-
twentieth century society, the resources of the child protection
agencies and of the juvenile court are needed now more than
ever. The private petition, with its rich historical basis, provides
one excellent means to serve this strong contemporary need.
VI. BRINGING PRIVATE CHIPS PETITION IN JUVENILE COURT
A. Private CHIPS Petition is Allowed
Within the context of the statutory and rule scheme in juve-
nile court, the private CHIPS petition provides one way to access
the resources of juvenile court. Juvenile CHIPS proceedings re-
sult in a unique melding of the judicial system and the welfare
system. Therefore, when accessed and used appropriately, pri-
vate CHIPS petitions provide for an effective resolution to the
troubling issues faced by children and families today.
Despite the changes that have occurred, one critical item has
remained consistent throughout the history of the statutes and
rules that govern juvenile court proceedings. Specifically, direct
305. See BREMNER, supra note 43, at 351-52.
306. See GROSSBERG, supra note 53, at 4-9. See also supra notes 53-56 and accompany-
ing text.
307. See PLECK, supra note 25, at 69; Thomas, supra note 29, at 310.
308. See Thomas, supra note 29, at 329.
309. Id. at 312-13.
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access to the juvenile court has been provided to family mem-
bers and interested persons, in addition to state agencies, county
attorney's offices, and welfare departments. Cases involving
CHIPS are not criminal cases, and there is no constitutional or
other prohibition to prevent someone other than an agent of
the state 10 from bringing a petition.
A historical review makes it clear that it has always been ex-
pected that society in general, and families in particular, would
have access to the resources necessary to help them resolve their
problems.3"' This was certainly true in colonial society and later
on the western frontier.3 2 The cruelty societies and the Progres-
sive Era reforms all emphasized access to resources and pro-
grams in the community. 313  Furthermore, the current
Minnesota statutory framework emphasizes the goal of maintain-
ing children in their homes or returning them as soon as
possible. 14
The statutory provisions allowing family members and inter-
ested persons to initiate private CHIPS petitions have been con-
sistent throughout the history of Minnesota law. In fact, as
noted earlier in this Article, statutes dating back to the 1900s
specifically provided that any reputable person could bring a pe-
tition upon sworn affidavit before the court. 315 This provision
still appears in the current version of the statute. 16 The current
statute, while specifically allowing any reputable person to peti-
tion the juvenile court,317 also indicates that "[u]nless otherwise
provided by rule or order of the court, the county attorney shall
draft the petition upon the showing of reasonable grounds to
support the petition."31 8
The history of Minnesota's rules of juvenile procedure further
demonstrates that the rules allow family members and interested
persons to access the resources of the juvenile courts. At the
time that the 'juvenile protection rules"3 1 9 were written, the au-
310. State agents include county and city attorneys.
311. PLECK, supra note 25, at 79.
312. See supra part II.E.
313. See TIFIN, supra note 42, at 40; Thomas, supra note 29, at 310. See also supra part
II.D.
314. SeeMINN. STAT. § 260.011 (1992).
315. Act of Apr. 20, 1917, ch. 397, § 7, 1917 MINN. LAws 561, 564.
316. MINN. STAT. § 260.131 (1992).
317. Id., subd. 1.
318. Id., subd. 2.
319. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
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thors of those rules grappled with the issue of access to the juve-
nile courts. The drafters of Rule 53.01 stated that "[a] 11 petitions
shall be drafted and filed under the supervision of the county
attorney unless Minnesota Statute [sic] or the court by rule or
order permits counsel, other than the county attorney, to draft
and file a petition with the court. '3 20 Recognizing that there
may be circumstances under which a court might issue a blanket
rule or an order specifically disallowing a petition to be filed by
someone other than the county attorney, the drafters of the
rules, in interpreting the statute, have made it clear that there
are circumstances under which such petitions should be al-
lowed.3 21 Another rule specifically recognizes that there may be
petitioners other than the county attorney who would have a
right to participate in the hearing along with the person who
drafted and filed the petition.322
In recent years, the question of access to the juvenile court
through private CHIPS petition has revolved more around the
allocation of resources than around legal availability. 323 This is
particularly true as CHIPS cases drain on the resources of the
juvenile courts, social service agencies, and treatment centers.
These resources may be used to assist a child who would have
been approved for assistance under the screening procedures of
a county attorney's office or child protection unit.
The issue from a policy standpoint is whether the juvenile
courts, with all of their resources and powers,324 should be acces-
sible by persons other than the narrow scope of persons and
families identified in the political climate of child protection
and county attorney units. Permitting interested persons to initi-
ate a CHIPS proceeding does encourage widespread use of re-
sources for the child, but these resources are then available to
children and families who are in need of the court's assistance.
Despite this debate over the use of resources, the juvenile
courts themselves have facilitated the use of the court's re-
320. MINN. R. Juv. P. 53.01, subd. 1 (1994).
321. See SONSTENG & ScoTr, supra note 204, Rule 53.01 author's cmt. (stating that
such petitions may be drafted and filed by private attorneys, legal assistants, or county
welfare workers, as long as the county attorney supervises the process).
322. MINN. R.Juv. P. 39.05 (1994).
323. Pleadings, In re A.V., Hennepin County Juvenile Court File No. 148071-96;
Committee Notes, Ad Hoc Committee on CHIPS Proceedings in Hennepin County
(Aug. 13, 1992) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).
324. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260.181, subd. 2; 260.191 (1992 & Supp. 1993). See also
supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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sources by family members and interested persons acting on be-
half of a child in need of protection or services. Directly
following the passage of the 1988 CHIPS statute, the Hennepin
County district court generally allowed the filing of a private
CHIPS petition by anyone, and in fact, provided formats and fill-
in-the-blank forms in order to assist the public in accessing the
juvenile court.
32 5
B. Bringing a Private CHIPS Petition
1. Current Status
During the period that the Hennepin County courts were per-
mitting private CHIPS petitioners to access the resources of the
court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard a case involving
access to the juvenile court under the termination of parental
rights statutes.3 26
In the case of In re S.F.,327 an attorney, on behalf of a private
petitioner, requested an order from the Hennepin County dis-
trict court allowing the petitioner to file a termination of paren-
tal rights petition.3 28 The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that
the lower court had erred in refusing to issue an order allowing
the private termination petition to be filed.329
The court specifically found that the proposed petition for ter-
mination of parental rights met the content requirements of
Minnesota Rules ofJuvenile Procedure Rule 53.02, and that the alle-
gations contained in the petition, if proven, would support a
finding that a statutory ground for termination existed. Conse-
quently, the court of appeals held that the lower court should
have allowed the petition to be filed to give the petitioner access
to the juvenile court.33' Thus, the court indicated that when the
content requirements of the petition are met, then the lower
court must issue an order allowing the termination petition to
be filed. 31
Because the same procedural requirements are used in the fil-
ing of a termination of parental rights petition under the juve-
325. Juvenile Law, Part Two: Allen Oleisky, Hamline University School of Law.
326. In re S.F., 482 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
327. 482 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
328. Id. at 501.
329. Id. at 503-04.
330. Id. at 504.
331. Id.
1994]
49
Walling and Debele: Private Chips Petitions in Minnesota: The Historical and Contempo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM M/TCHELL LAW REVIEW
nile code.. 2 and under the juvenile protection rules, 33 the
results of that case have direct application to the ability to file a
private CHIPS petition. Thus, if a CHIPS petition is presented
to the court and if that petition conforms to the contents por-
tion of Rule 53.02'11 and contains sufficient allegations which, if
proven, would constitute a finding that a Child in Need of Pro-
tection or Services case exists, then the court may allow the filing
of that petition through special order.335
More specifically, the termination of parental rights cases
make it clear that the court is not free to ignore the require-
ments of the statute 3 6 or the rule of juvenile procedure. 3 7
Thus, if the private petition presented to the court contains suffi-
cient allegations to constitute a finding that a child is in need of
protection or services pursuant to the statute, 3 8 the court must
at least allow the petition to be filed with supporting evidence.
Additionally, the court may hold an initial hearing on the peti-
tion to allow supportive testimony.3 9
In approaching the court, the petitioner alleging CHIPS status
might allege that the child is abandoned; 4 ° is a victim of various
types of abuse;34 1 lacks necessary food, clothing, or shelter;
34 2
lacks the special care required by a particular physical, mental,
or emotional condition; 43 is medically neglected; 3.. is one
whose parent for good cause desires to be relieved of the care
and custody of the child;3 45 lacks proper parental care because
of the emotional or physical disability of or the immaturity of the
parent;34 6 or any of the other specific criteria contained within
the statute. 47 In essence, the private CHIPS petition intertwines
the historical precedent of allowing private access to the re-
332. MINN. STAT. § 260.131 (1992).
333. MINN. R. Juv. P. 53 (1994).
334. MINN. K Juv. P. 53.03 (1994).
335. Id.
336. MINN. STAT. § 260.135, subd. 3 (1992).
337. MINN. R. Juv. P. 53.01 (1994).
338. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1992 & Supp. 1993).
339. In re S.F., 482 N.W.2d 500, 503-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
340. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a(1) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
341. Id., subd. 2a(2).
342. Id., subd. 2a(3).
343. Id., subd. 2a(4).
344. Id., subd. 2a(5).
345. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a(6) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
346. Id., subd. 2a(8).
347. Id., subd. 2a.
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sources of the juvenile court, the statutory language that has ex-
isted in the statutes for many years, and the current rules of
juvenile procedure. This intertwining provides flexibility within
the court system to make the resources available to the children
and families who need them. The private CHIPS petition, there-
fore, provides an access point to the juvenile court and all of its
resources by families and interested reputable persons, without
the necessity of obtaining the political approval of the welfare
department or the county attorney.
Since the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Minnesota Statutes
require that notice of the CHIPS petition be given to the
county,3 48 there is no danger that the position of the county at-
torney and welfare department will not be brought before the
court. This leaves no justification at all for a blanket rule
preventing the filing of private CHIPS petitions. In fact, these
procedures raise the question of whether a specific rule should
be promulgated identifying clear criteria as to when a private
CHIPS petition will be accepted without a special order of the
court.
2. Suggestions For Improvement
The resources of the juvenile court should not be available to
anyone who walks into the court. Rather, as indicated in In re
S.F 34 9 and also in the rules ofjuvenile procedure 350 and the Min-
nesota statutes, 35' a certain level of "probable cause," or showing
that the child is in fact a CHIPS child, should be required before
a family member or interested person can access all of the re-
sources and powers of the juvenile court.
On the other hand, monitoring requirements at the time of
filing seems impractical. Instead, it would be more appropriate
to allow for some sort of judicial review of the allegations con-
tained within the petition. A clear analogy can be drawn be-
tween the procedures followed on a private CHIPS petition and
those followed on a post-decree motion to modify custody under
the family court provisions of Minnesota Statute Chapter 518. In
a family court case, while a motion may be filed and a first hear-
348. MINN. STAT. § 260.135 (1992); MINN. R. Juv. P. 44.02, subd. 3 (1994).
349. 482 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
350. MINN. R. Juv. P. 53 (1994).
351. MINN. STAT. § 260.131 (1992).
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ing scheduled, 52 it is at this point that the court reviews the mo-
tion and affidavits and considers the matter to determine
whether an evidentiary hearing, a custody evaluation, or further
proceedings would be appropriate.
In a private CHIPS proceeding, all persons should be permit-
ted to file a petition and to participate in an initial hearing on
that petition. This should be made clear by court rule and pol-
icy. At that point, the petition, however, should be subject to
review and dismissal if it does not reach the requisite level of
"probable cause." In this manner, the resources of the juvenile
courts can be accessed by the public who, after all, are the clients
the court is designed to serve. At the same time, access to the
juvenile court would be controlled in a way that ensures that
only those cases which are appropriate will move further into the
juvenile court system. In this manner, rather than being a closed
system available only to those situations deemed politically ap-
propriate by the welfare departments and the county attorney,
the juvenile courts will be open to the children and families that
they were originally designed to help.
VII. CONCLUSION
The juvenile courts of the United States and, specifically, Min-
nesota are in many ways a potpourri or even dumping ground
for addressing the needs of those children who do not fit well
into other court systems. Whether we call it "dependency," "ne-
glect," or "CHIPS," the reality is that the historical background
of these cases make it clear that it was the intent of the drafters
of these statutes and the promoters of court involvement in the
lives of families and children who are experiencing crisis that the
resources and powers available to the juvenile courts would be
available to the population in general.
With the development of tighter budgets, political policies,
placement committees, county contracts, and otherwise limited
resources, there is a natural inclination to attempt to restrict ac-
cess to the juvenile court. Nevertheless, neither the philosophi-
cal history, nor the statutory development and analysis, nor the
best interests of the children allow for such a narrow restriction.
The juvenile courts, with all of their power and resources, must
continue to serve the needs of children and families. Restricting
352. Id. § 518.18 (1992); see also Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471,
472 (Minn. 1981).
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access by the public to such courts can never be seen as further-
ing this goal. The juvenile courts should, therefore, be accessi-
ble to the children and families who need them. Greater use of
the private CHIPS petition will ensure that these children and
their families will have access to the juvenile courts.
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